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DISTANCE AHD COMPETITICW
Of Leuven
' '•- Steven Ongena
f $lb««j University;
I. Introduction
-%>,;. Banks derive market power ex post from private '
JfifGrmatiQn they obtain about firms during the course of the
{adding relationship or ex ante from their relative physical -^
proximity to the borrowing firms. Closer banks enjoy significantly
lower costs of monitoring and transacting with small firms,
ijuch that "if other banks are relatively f«r,r<tlose banks have
considerable market power" (Petersen and Rajan(1995), p. 417>:
;' We directly study the effect on loan conditions of th»
geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and ,
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all other banks in the vicinity, controlling for relevant --•*?•*
relationship, loan, bank branch, firm, and regional ; . ••-••"
characteristics. For our study, we employ a unique data :-• '' 'Si
set containing detailed loan contract information (including;-* ' -""*-
firm and lender identities and addresses) from more than -\ , ..*
15,000 bank loans to (predominantly) small firms as well as \'};-(
information on competing bank branches in the vicinity of, .- - : '' ?'?.
the firm. • • ".. ••.•-"-?"
We find that, in line with predictions emanating from , \
theory modeling spatial price discrimination, borrowing costs .'.;;•:
decrease in the distance between the firm and the lending bank. '•'<•.
We identify banking competition and pricing strategies in our -,*
analysis by including both the number of bank branches (or branch "
concentration) and the distance between the borrower and competing);
bank branches in the vicinity. We observe that increasing distanc&
between the borrower and alternative lenders significantly relaxes*
price competition and results in substantially higher borrowing j
costs for the firm. . . ...*
Fetersen and Raj an (2002) and Berger et al. (2001a) also- ;?j3
study the correspondence between distance and lending conditions.:*
Petersen and Rajan (2002) focus on the increasing distance and . :-."!
changing modes of communication between small firms and their : W<
lenders in the United States over the last 25 years. Berger, ^
Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2001a) document how large '-*
banks lend at a greater distance than small banks in the tf.S.̂ f' ?.
In contrast, we analyze contract terms of loans granted by a "' "!j
single bank and incorporate not only the distance between the'
borrowing firm and this lender, but also the distance between
the firm and the competing banks in the vicinity to identify the
presence of spatial price discrimination. We further document
that the distance between the European firms and the bank in our ;
study did not increase substantially over the period 1975-1997. --;
Other empirical work reveals the impact of geographical
distance on related activities of financial intermediaries, such
as for example, cross-border bank lending and branching (Berger
et al. (2001b), Buch (2001), Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou
(1996), Grosse and Goldberg (1991)). Distance may also determine
the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank
holding companies (Berger and DeYoung (2001)), the strength of
informational contagion between banks (Aharony and Swary (1996)),
and the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of
U.S. private firms (Lerner (1995)). %
Physical distance may further influence activities on
.financial markets in general. International capital flows seem .
bound by geographical proximity (Fortes and Rey (2001)), but
so is possibly the composition and returns on actively managed
U.S. mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), the trading
profitability of traders on the German electronic exchange Xetra
.(Hau (2001)) and the portfolio choices of Finnish investors
(Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). He contribute to this growing
literature by analyzing the impact of both the distances between
..lender-borrower and competing banks-borrower on the pricing of
bank loans to bank-dependent small firms.
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-V' We organize the rest'&f ;the paper as follows: Section
.11 --reviews the literature on distance, leading relationships/
duct competition; Section III introduces the data and discusses
the methodology used in owe paper; Section IV displays and
discusses the empirical .rwultsj Section V concludes, :: ,-: .
.Review
"*$%;< "'•• Recent theoretical- papers highlight the importance of - >;-,i
distance in explaining the- • availability and pricing of bank ..?.
loans. Lending conditions may depend on the distance between
the borrower and the lender and the distance between the borrower
and .the closest competing bank. ,
,*„ .•:", In traditional location differentiation models (Hotelling -.
ft829tv« Salop (1979)), bof rowers incur transportation costs
visiting their bank branch. 'Total transportation costs naturally
increase in distance. Banks price uniformly if they cannot observe
borrower location or are prohibited to chargê  different prices
to different borrowers- Borrowers pay the sane interest rate but
incur different transportation costs depending on their location
vis-a-vis the lending bank. y: . ;
..- ; However, if banks can observe the borrowers' location, .,
and' offer interest rates baaed on that information, they may •-,_ ...
engage in spatial price discrimination. If borrowers incur theil
own transportation cost, a bank, will charge a higher interest,
rate to those borrowers located closest to its branch (see :-"'.'
Lederer and Hurter (1986)). Hence, discriminatory pricing based '
on transportation costs implies, for a given number of banks, ;.
a negative relationship between the loan rate and the borrower^
lender distance and a similar, positive relationship between
the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the
closest competing bank.
. The cost of servicing a borrower could also be related
to physical distance. For example, bank costs increase in
borrower -lender distance, because of extra communication costs
or transportation costs incurred by banks visiting the borrowers'
premises. Loan rates passing through such costs will increase
in distance. However, monitoring costs increasing in distance
may also give rise to discriminatory pricing. For example, in
Sussman and zeira (1995), spatial price discrimination arises
because all banks face monitoring costs increasing in distance,
have a strong bargaining position, and extract all the gains
of trade. Discrimination again implies a negative (positive)
relationship between the loan rate and the borrower- lender
(borrower-closest competing bank) distance (for a given number
of banks) . The correspondence between borrower- lender distance
and loan rate becomes non-monotonic if monitoring costs are also
dependent on loan size {Hong and Chah (1993)).
Lenders may initially be unsure about the exact location
of the borrower. For example, if the borrower maintains multiple
centers of activity, it is not clear at first for the bank
where to monitor. In that case, the bank can only engage in
discriminatory pricing upon becoming informed about the location
and transportation costs faced by their borrowers. In Dell'Ariccia
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for example, banks become informed about the location
of the borrower through first period lending. In his model, oniy
*relationship" banks, lending in their second period, can engage
in spatial price discrimination, while de novo "transactionsM
banks have to resort to "mill pricing™. , :̂
" The severity of the asymmetric information problem ••*"-',
itself may also increase in distance. Hauswald and Marquez ; '
(2000) develop a model in which the precision of the signal
about a borrower's quality received by a bank decreases in -\
distance. Because banks will receive more precise signals ;•
^about close borrowers, competing banks will face increasing
adverse selection problems when approaching borrowers closer
:tp the most informed bank. Hence, the informed relationship
bank can charge higher interest rates to closer borrowers while
the uninformed transactional banks will charge higher interest"
rates to borrowers located farther afield due to the increase :
•In the adverse selection problem. Ceteris paribus, Hauawald
and Marquez (2000) derive a negative (positive) relationship
between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower
and the relationship (transactional) bank. ''•>
The number of banks in the market is inversely related to
the distance between the lender and the (closest) competing banks.
An increase in the number of banks leads to more competition
, and possibly lowers the loan rates. For example, a decrease )&£ ,«,
£the fixed setup costs per bank in Sussman and Zeira (1995) and .'-,!
garrison et al, (1999) increases the number of banks, decreases 3
the distance between any two neighboring banks, and decreases -';
j-the loan rate for each bank-borrower distance combination. . - -.• ̂
£•• On the other hand, competition between more banks / , ••./'*
^aggravates an adverse selection problem by enabling lower \
quality borrowers to obtain financing, resulting in moral ;
hazard and credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan (1995)) or a .'-JS!
higher interest rate (Broecker (1990), Cao and Shi (2001)). In 1
Dell'Ariccia (2001), adverse selection generates an endogenous 'i;
.fixed cost constituting a barrier to entry in the industry . :,-,=•:,-. ",1»
limiting the number of banks competing in the market. ---.L~:3£
A decrease in the fixed cost component of the = . -
.relationship building technology in Hauswald and Marquez
. (2000) similarly not only leads to an increase in the number .
><*Of banks and more competition, but also results in a retrenchment
£towards relationship lending. The lower entry barrier then leads
to sharper adverse selection problems and higher loan rates
for the borrowers closest to the relationship lender but lower
loan rates for customers farther away. In effect, loan rates
will decrease (increase) more per unit in distance between the
borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank.
"*-• Borrowers may not be fully informed about the precise
location of all the competitors' branches and the availability
and conditions of the loans offered there. For example, Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) and Bester and Petrakis (1995) model such
location cum informational differentiation. In Grossman and
Shapiro (1984), consumers buy a product from a particular seller
upon becoming informed of its location through advertising. The
advertising itself is not-localized. The sales price in their
IX. Relationship Lending 409
. exceeds the full information pticê iby the magnitude of the
•transportation cost, as informational differentiation lowers the
jjaaticity of demand. In addition, consumers in their model, as
tl»6y ate unaware of all sellers, do not necessarily patronize the
•loosest" one.. -,. ,*. ••>••;.. Vs.. . . . • . ' . ,
;:'iv< - '• Bester Btd Petrakis (1995) model the advertising of lower
price offers . Absent advertising, customers are only informed ~
about "local" prices. They show that firms will advertise lower * -
prices to attract customers from distant locations . Hence, more
lii&tant and informed customers will be observed to receive lower
juices. , ' - , , - • .•- - = - - ;.; • ;, ,• - • - -
However, it should be noted that the location of the?. " f
bank branch is just one out of many characteristics of a banking.
product that are important for the borrowers. Consequently^ .*.'•?
borrowers do not always visit the bank branch located closest
:wften another bank's product exhibits other, more preferred,
characteristics. And, once borrowers have experienced a good y '
match and observed the high quality of the services provided by
their current bank, they will only switch to another bank branch
%hen offered a considerably lower price (Tirole (1988), p. 294).
fe To conclude, most theoretical models imply a negative
.̂(positive) correspondence between, the borrower- lender (competing
&ank) distance and the loan r»te, but information availability,
&cperience, and other product characteristics may abate the
'strength of the distance-loan -rate relationship. However, as far
as we are aware, no paper has yet empirically investigated these
associations, or lack thereof, directly and comprehensively.
I
Ill- Eia£»'i,gMJ|i''JBfreTiit"; Study Methodology
Contracts
;.; : He extend a data set ' ctetaled in Degryse and van•41998) and employed by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) . The
original data set consists of 17,776 loans given to independents
(or single-person businesses), and small, medium, and large sized
firms- by an important Belgian bank which operates all over
Belgium. Around 80% of the firms are single-person businesses
(sole proprietorships) . Some borrowers take several loans from
this bank; the data set covers loans granted to 13,104 borrowers —
implying that the average borrower maintained 1.36 loans at that
bank. The sample commences with all existing loans at the bank as
of August 10, 1997 that were initiated after January 1, 1995.
For each borrower we calculate the distance to both the
lending bank and the branches of all other, competing banks
located in the same postal zone as the borrower. As of December
31, 1994, we identify 7,477 branches, operated by 145 different
banks and located in 837 different postal zones. Each postal
zone carries a postal code between 1,000 and 9,999. The first
digit-, in the code indicates a geographical area, we call "postal
area1*, which in most cases coincides with one of the ten Provinces
in Belgium. A postal zone covers on average 36 sq km, and contains
approximately nine bank branches. Not surprisingly, borrowers are
often located in more densely banked areas, with, on average, more
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than 17 bank branches per postal zone, resulting in around 25t),G06
possible borrower-bank branch pairs. ^
We employ both web-based MapBlast.com and PC-baaed MS -;.-.
Mappoint to track the shortest traveling time (in minutes) by ;;.
car between the borrower and each bank branch. We choose the .; ;•shortest traveling time, the default setting in both programs,
over a number of other mapping alternatives, as we suspect that ,
for most entrepreneurs in our sample, variable transportation - ,
costs consists mainly out of traveling time spent. We provide .':
concrete statistics on this issue when we discuss the results and
employ the fastest driving distance (in kilometers) in robustness
exercises.
Address recording errors, incomplete map coverage, and
changes in street names (we have 1995 addresses but the software
is using up-to-date maps) cut in our sample. We drop 801 contract;
that were either relocated or where the borrower switched to
another or a new branch after the closure of their old one. Next,
we conservatively remove the 1% borrowers located farthest from
their lending bank, as we discover that 'a combination of address-
recording errors, mapping problems, and non-standard borrowing
motives and business arrangements are responsible for most of;--- \
.these longer distances. Finally, we lay aside 612 contracts
^located in postal zones without competing banks. We return to ...
:<this set of contracts later in the paper. -.-\
" Table 1 provides summary statistics for the remaining • ;
•,15,044 contracts. Table 1 shows the definition, mean, median,
'-minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of selected variables. :\
-- ' ' '• '"--*-- ------ -V* -.:? J: „ .^f-^aKL^^^ _•_ .' . . .. ,_.,r • ™* >-f
Distance to Lender -•" ; . - > - ' . - .. • . . . r._
The median borrower is located around 4 minutes and 20
seconds from the lender, which depending on the local road . - ̂
conditions, translates into 2.25 kilometers (1.40 miles) of £
driving at 31 km/h (20 mph) . In contrast, Petersen and Rajan r;;;|i
(2002) find that the median distance between lending banks and (•
small OS firms covered by the 1993 National Survey of Small ~-yf
Business Finance (KSSBF) is more than double, i.e. 4 miles. • . --•%•
However, the median firm in the NSSfcF employs 2 to 4 employee3,.'.̂
while the median firm in our sample is a sole proprietorship. -ij
In addition, costs of driving may differ substantially between -JC
Belgium and the U.S., and Belgian businesses may be limited • - "
by the size of the country in their choice of domestically • ;-4i
located banks. These arguments may also explain the even larger •
differences with the other distance statistics Petersen and Rajai
(̂2002) report. For example, the average (75 percentile) borrower?-
bank distance in our sample is around 3 (3,5) miles, while the -^
same'borrower in Petersen and Rajan (2002) communicates across ;,
42.5 '(14) miles with her bank, or across a whopping 252 (255) '••;
miles with her other financial institutions. • j
Petersen and ftajan (2002) also report that the distance .g
between U.S. borrowers and banks has increased dramatically ove^
time. For example, the median bank-borrower distance has more
than doubled between the »id-70s and the early-90s from 2 to 5
miles, while the average distance more than quadrupled from 16 (
. to .,68 miles. In contrast, in our sample, the median and average
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d̂istances between the borrowers and the Belgian bank we study
&ocraased.by only around.~30%>-..front 4-, (6.85) in 1975,to 5.2 (8.86)in, 1997. ....--•; ,':'-,-: ,-.-,• -, ' ',->...:';,' , "- . - . . - . , ... - .,,•;. "• -.-̂ Most of the modest increase in; traveling time in our sample
to occur during the early-90s. This'increase may be partly
by the changes in the .number of bank branches because of
'regulatory driven de-apecialization of financial intermediation
ind resulting consolidation., --•,: - . -Possible selection issues may further complicate the
assessment of this moderate growth in distance between bank and *.
borrowers (Petersen and Rajan (2002X1; For example, firms may be
poached, and hence may switch, banks more frequently if they are'
located farther away from a bank brahchv And, if we look at the
evolution of distance by loan origination date, we find that -
average distance actually decreases from 7.7 minutes in 1995 to6<«68 minutes in 1997! He are therefore tempted to conclude that
our findings with respect to the evolution over time of the
lender-borrower distances ratten a study by Buch (2001). She
'reports that in the period 1̂ 83 through 1998, distance became less
,&q>oftant for international bank lending by U.S. banks, in starkcontrast to European banks for which distance remained of the same
Importance. He will nevertheless control for possible changes over
time in lending technology in robustness exercises.
Distance to Closest Competitor;'"::>-:-.-•""'•-•*'• i- • •-'•'.'•- ••..:.".•'.'-,'., ,,S
."./.- We now turn to our other main variable of interest,
distance to the closest competitors. The median (average) -
borrower in our sample is located 2 (2) minutes from the
closest competitor or 3 minutes and IS (50) seconds from the :
quartile closest competitor located in the same postal zone'.
The quartile closest competitor is the bank branch with the 25-.
percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone as
the borrower. We select'this second measure as our metric of
competitor proximity for obvious measurement reasons. Omissions,
recording, or mapping errors are less likely to influence the 25
percentile-statistic than the shortest distance statistic. In
addition, bank branches may not be entirely homogeneous in their
product offerings. In that case, we also conjecture our 25%
measure to be more highly correlated with the distance to theclosest, "truly" competing bank branch than the minimum distance
metric. In any case,,we Will also check for robustness of our
results with respect to this ra priori choice of proximity metric
The lending bank is located closer than the quartile
(closest) competitor in more than 44% (25%) of the borrower
contract cases making distance a relevant bank (product)
characteristic for a sizeable minority of the borrowers in
our data set. A majority of the borrowers do not seem overly
constrained by geographical proximity. Hence, our statistics
suggest that, while distance is important, information,
reputation, and other bank characteristics may also determine
the choice of lender and the resulting loan conditions.
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Relationship Characteristics
Relationship characteristics are therefore central to ; ,
our analysis in capturing information and experience effects.
The first characteristic in this category. Main Bank, indicates
whether this bank considers itself as the main bank of that f££m :
or not. The definition used by the bank to determine whether it '<
is the main bank is "having a monthly 'turnover' on the current
account of at least BEF 100,000 (U.S. 52,500), and buying at least
two products from that bank". More than half of all borrowers are
classified as Main Bank customers. Main Bank captures the scope of
the relationship. This includes whether this firm also buys other -
products from this bank and executes moat of its payments via this
bank. If these sources of information improve the accuracy of the •
bank's information or reduce the monitoring costs, the measure
Main Bank should reduce the expected cost of such loans. But Main
Bank also proxies for the lack of information a borrower has about
alternatives. In that case, a main bank customer will pay a higher,
loan rate, but may be less subject to spatial price
discrimination. ." -,',-' ,'; \ '•"•.--•'
The second relationship variable is the Duration of the
financial Relationship In years with that particular bank at the
time the loan rate is decided upon. A relationship starts when a -
firm buys for the first time a product from that bank. The average*
duration of the relationship in the sample is about eight years.
Duration proxies for the increased time for a firm to experience
the banks' products and appreciate the added flexibility the bank
has to maintain and fulfill implicit contracts. While the bank
gains private information about a firm and tailors its products,
the firm may also become locked-in. Hence, a long-term bank ;
customer may pay a higher loan rate, but become less subject to "
discriminatory pricingi. '•^-^^•^.^;-l^^'y^j\•. * .*?;- -•• -' ",;=
Competition
Finally, we also enlist in our main analysis the Number •
of Competitors, which is defined as the number of bank branches
(minus the lender's) in the borrower's postal zone. In most
of the discussed spatial models, the number of competitors '• ;
corresponds inversely to the sum of the distance to the lender
and the closest competitor. This is also the case in our sample,;
though the correlation coefficient seems small in absolute value
The correlation coefficient for the lumber of Competitors and "
the sum of the Distance to Lender and Distance to the quartile
(actual) Closest Competitor for each contract is only -0.023***
(-0.103**-) . - •'- - . . , - • • • . : . • - •„- •; .' ' - ;. v.".-;•-
An obvious candidate to explain the small correlation ,;
coefficient is the spatial simplification embedded in the ,
•theoretical models discussed earlier in the paper. Geographical/!
clustering of business and banking activities across a land ". ,.
surface may weaken any correspondence between distance and the -.
number of bank branches. In addition, there are also the • •.. -\
differences in surface size of the postal zones. A cursory look
on the map suggests many postal zones are roughly equal in size.
However, there are exceptions such as the postal zones in the
Capital Brussels (which are small) arid,the postal zones in "tlib, ;.
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or West̂ iartdSifs- fwBich are; large) ;i
1t$(iiice&.rare most likely related to differences in for;
ilition density, the number of businesses, and other possiblê
the postal system used to zone the country. He inc lu<te{ >
area dummies (which cover around lOtt zones each) in .-'
•adtlition to the base case to control "for these differences in:
Wffle size. He will also introduce postal zone and bank bcanofe.;
effects in robustness exercises* •'•".-• ?"•; : -'•!- -"--•';• • . ' -, V v" .•:'.
Other Variables
.--- •-'. . The rest of the variables axe: also. discussed at length
in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and ih1 our working paper, ;- '. ••••
-so we abridge the write-up here. Consider the loan contract .
characteristics. The first- is the interest Rate on the loan ~: : ^ -
until the next revision; -The average; interest rate on a- loan. -
in our sample is 8.12% or 812-:basis points, (we will employ ....
basis points throughout . the paper to facilitate the tabulation
and interpretation of the results). The median loan size is BEF
.300,000 (USD 7,500), but varies between BEJ? 5,000 and 80,000,000.
We will assume in our empirical analysis that loan rate and size
are determined jointly. The variable Collateral indicates whether
the loan is collateral! zed or not. We have no further information
on the type of collateral' provided. Approximately 26% of the loans
^are collaterallzed. He will assume, as in for example Berger
and Udell (1995), HarhoM and KOrting (1998), and Elsas and
Kcahnen (1998) among others,, that collateral and interest rate
conditions are determined aetguantially, with the collateral
decision preceding the interest rate determination. Indeed,
collateral is often pledged at the beginning of a relationship,
possibly infrequently and/or inconsistently adjusted, and may
end up covering multiple loans. However, we will investigate
alternative decision sequences with respect to loan size and
collijSeral in robustness checks.
'.'-; "Another loan contract characteristic is the Repayment
Duration of the Loan. For all loans to the firms, we know at what
'speed' the loans are repaid. This allows us to compute the exact
repayment duration of a loan. Be include the natural logarithm of
this variable in the regression analysis in order to proxy for the
risk associated̂  with the time until the loan is repaid. He also
include dummies capturing the type of loan the firm is taking; The
distinction is made between Business Mortgage, Bridging Finance,
Prepay Taxes, Business Term, and Consumer Credit loans. The size
of most loans is rather small, because a large part of our loans
are of the Prepay Taxes and Consumer Credit type. He also include
a Rollover dummy, which takes a value of one if the loan is given
to prepay another loan, and is zero otherwise. Four dummies
capture the effect of the revisability of the loan.
The firm characteristics include both proxies for
the size and legal form of the firm. He distinguish between
Sole Proprietorships (82.99% of the sample). Small (15.98%>,
Medium (0.89%), and Large (0.14%) Firms, and between Sole
Proprietorships, Limited Partnerships (11.97%), Limited
Partnerships with Equal Sharing (1.17%), Corporations (3.78%),
and temporary Bridge Arrangements (0.09%). In the regressions,
I
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tie exclude the dummy for Sole Proprietorships. We include 49 *"Y; _
two-digit Nomenclature Generale des Activates Economiques \., " !
dans ['Union Europeenne (MACE) code dummies to capture . , . ;̂'-;
industry characteristics. :: V
'. The interest rate variables are incorporated to control .-* .
for the underlying cost of capital in the economy. We control &>;£,
variations in the cost of capital by including four variables. '...
The first is the interest rate on a Belgian Government Security
with the same repayment duration as the loan granted to the firm.
We calculate this interest rate using the exact date of granting
the loan to the firm. Secondly, we include a Term Spread, defined
as the difference between the yield on a Belgian government bond
with repayment duration of five years and the yield on a 3 -months
Treasury bill. Finally, we incorporate two year dummies (1995
ti»*.-base case) to control, for. business cycle effects. .
Regression Analysis - • _ -! , " ' -
This section provides th£ empirical .results of tfte
determinants of the loan rate. He analyze the determinants
loan rate by regressing the loan interest rate on our -distance", .
relationship, competition, and control variables (which include . -
loan contract characteristics, firm characteristics, and interest
rates) . We use the ordinary least squares estimation technique. .
We focus on the distance, relationship, and competition variables.
The other coefficients remain virtually unaltered, both as a
departure from Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and throughout
the exercises in this paper; hence we therefore neither
nor tabulate the estimated coefficients .in, this version of
working paper. .._, . ^ . ,..Vl,,̂,ĵ; _,: ,. _ .
a»i«tioDahii> Characteristics' i . ••• —- -•;,£. ,;?;•:.« -*v - . . --• '-:-••:•• ?'.-:* v.f$
He first discuss the empirical; results concerning the
role of relationships. These variables play a more prominent-- > ••••*••>
role in our analysis of the impact , of distance on loan ; •"
conditions. He capture the role of the bank-firm relationship .A- -i
in two complementary ways . Our first \ndicator of relationship rs
strength. Main Bank, measures the scope of the bank-firm - ..-;
relationship. The loan rate is .decreasing in the scope of the - .-
relationship. The results in Table 2 show that a firm pays 41***
basis points less when the scope of a relationship is sufficiently
broad, - . " - . • - . i -.. .- -•_-••'••"- ••• . ' '•,--"•• •.,.' . - - - • - - ; - • , • - ;
•nj.- .The second indicator is the Duration of the Relationship" -s
between the lending bank and the borrower. He take the log, -of
the Duration of the Relationship as we expect the marginal impact
on the; loan rate to decrease in the duration of the financial .: v
relationship. The coefficient is significantly positive, abound
19***, implying that the loan rate increases in the duration :of ;r
the relationship, as in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) . ftn ;•
increase in duration from. 7.5 (median) to 13 (median plus one ;..,.̂
standard deviation) years increases the loan rate by around .
basis points, i - -">r ™&;l-s"';<- '̂ i ;';••-;. \ - r - f f f } - -. • - ". -:-"'v:i
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_
•~; We incorporate in Table 2 Models lr II* aild HI both ourmeasures of backing competition (and the resulting market power
of the lending batik) and geographical distance. He first discuss
the competition measures. In line with the discussed spatial
models, we start by employing the Number of bank branches of the
Competitors operating in the postal zone where the borrower is
located- Be add the natural log of one plus this number to the -'
regression, and report the results in Model I. The coefficient
on In{Number of Competitors) i«.not significantly different from
zerô  Hence, when competition is measured by the number of bank
branches present in the same postal zone as the borrower, neither
the effects of induced competition nor adverse selection effects
seem to dominate.
In Model II, we replace the number of competitors by a more
commonly used measure of competition, the Herfindanl-Hirschman
Index (HHI). We resort tb using, the number of bank branches of
each bank in the postal zone to construct market shares. In
effect, we assume coordination occurs between branches of the
same bank, while our previous* measure of competition assumed ;;;,•'-•\,
branch independence. The resulting coefficient on the HHI equai*,
a-significant, but small, 35.3**. This estimate implies that abf
increase of 0.1 in the HHI, say from a competitive (HHI < 0.1) to •
a "highly concentrated" (HHI > 0.18) market, would increase the
loan rate by only 3.5 basis points.
••'' ; We introduce postal zone effects in Model III to control
bettef for the geographical variation in competition and. firm
characteristics. We exclude HHI and the postal area dummies/
as these variables are by definition spanned by the postal
zone effects. We also drop the industry dummies, as collinearity
problems hobble our calculations. A Lagrange multiplier test
indicates the effects are significant. We further test for the
orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors using a
Hausman (1976) test and cannot reject orthogonality. In addition,
we view our sample to be drawn from a large population. Hence, we
report the coefficients for the random effects model in column III
(the results for the fixed effects model are very similar). The
coefficients on all variables of interest are virtually
unaffected.
Finally, we replace the postal zone effects by bank branch
effects to capture branch specific variation in competition and/or
Spatial variation. Again, random effects seem preferred and the
estimated coefficients are very similar. We choose not to report
the results.
Distance
;• Be now turn to our distance variables of interest. We
the log of both distance measures. In (Distance to Closest
fjiBtitors) and In (Distance to Lender), as we conjecture the
Marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease {in absolute value
in distance. We will investigate the impact of this choice of
functional form in a robustness exercise. The positive and
significant coefficients on In(Distance to Closest Competitors)
in Models I, II, and III suggest that borrowers located farther
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away from coveting bank branches face a higher loan rate \ ,,' •
at the lending bank. These results are consistent with price
discrimination resulting from transportation costs, monitoring Y.--~
costs, as well as asymmetric information. Moreover, our proxy -
for the distance between the borrower and the closest competitor
may identify strategic behavior between banks, which our other
competition variables did not (or only partly) pick up. Indeed, ", •
even after controlling for the number of competitors, branch
concentration, postal zone and bank branch effects, the lending ;;'
bank seems to enjoy substantial market power that increases in
the distance to the closest competitors. In addition, this market
power decreases in the distance between the borrower and the :
lender itself, as indicated by the negative and significant ,;. t""coefficient on the variable In(Distance to Lender).
The location models discussed in section 2'provide precise
theoretical predictions concerning the sum of the coefficients on
both distance measures. In particular, given the locations of bank
branches, a marginal shift in the location of the borrower implies
that the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures should
equal zero. Therefore, in line with this theoretical prediction
emanating from simple location models, we restrict-the sum of the -
coefficients on both distance measures to equal zero in Model II i
(which coefficients are mostly easily interp re table) . We test the;-s
restriction and report the results in Model IV. The F-statistic ' ,-
equals 8.6 and hence we cannot reject the equality restriction.
Both distance effects are not only statistically but
also economically relevant. Using the estimates of Model IV,
for example, an increase of one standard deviation in the distance
between borrower and lender, i.e., the traveling time increasing
from 0 to 7.3 minutes, decreases the loan rate by 18 basis points.'
An increase of one standard deviation in the distance between •.,-•:'%
borrower and the closest competitors (from 0 to 2.3 minutes) -|
increases the loan rate by about 10 basis points. >-
For the median loan of BEF 300,000, annual outlays for -;'i
the borrower decrease by BEF 72 (U.S. SI.80) per extra minute '?&
of traveling to the lender. Belgiati entrepreneurs and (bank) 1
managers made around BEF 20 / minute in 1995, while the operating
costs for a car (gas, maintenance, tires) may have amounted to
around BEF 3 / minute of driving. Hence, according to a simple
linear transportation cost model the median borrower is expected
to make one-and-a-half additional round-trips to his bank branch
as a direct result of the new loan. Alternatively, according to
-a linear monitoring cost model, bank managers are expected to make
three round-trip visits to their median borrowers. We find these ]
estimates reasonable (given that, for example, loan repayment can
be organized by mail) but economically interesting on the margin. -
We subject our main results reported in Table 2 to a '
battery of robustness checks with respect to, for example,
variable definition and model specification. As all results . ~/4
remain virtually unaffected, we chose neither to tabulate nor ^
to discuss the results in this working paper. "•••'• -<:, i\
• • - -
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V. Conclusion
'̂tle directly study the effect on loan conditions of the
geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all
other banks in the vicinity 6f the firm. He report, as far as we
are' aware, the first comprehensive evidence of the occurrence of
apatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease
in the distance between the firm and the lender and increase
similarly in the distance between the firm and competing banks.
Both effects are statistically significant and economically
relevant. The results are robust to various changes in model *
specifications and variable definitions and seem not induced by
.the modest changes in leq&fcng technology we infer. The observed
Stability of the Belgian,bank branch system during our sample
period allows us to interpret the coefficients of the simple
reduced form specifications within the framework of static models
explaining spatial price discrimination.
'•- ; - , Overall, our results suggest that local loan officers
Maty price loans by location, though distance variables are not
[.featured explicitly in their formally acknowledged credit scoring
'system- However, granting some autonomy to local loan officers
iia assessing and pricing,local loan applications may be optimal
:"(St«in (2002)). Including qualitative, "soft factors" in the
scoring system provides the loan officers with the necessary
discretion. Brunner et al. (2000), for example, provide
preliminary empirical evidence {for Germany) of the importance
of qualitative factors in setting loan rates (through internal
bank ratings). He suspect that the loan officers, employed
at the1 bank we study, wield soft'factors to practice price
discrimination based on their location and. the presence of
alternative providers of financing in the vicinity of the firm.
If banks persist in pricing.loans by location, brick-and-
raortar branching may remain vital in ensuring access to credit at
reaadjiable rates, in particular for small firms and entrepreneurs,
While technological developments in communication and travel may
ultimately diminish the relevance of distance, we find only minor
traces of such developments in our sample (which envelops the
1975-1997 period). The latter result suggests that presaging
"the Death of Distance" remains somewhat premature in a European
banking context.
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Borrowing Coats and the Role of Distance
Independent Variables
In (Distance to Lender
ln(Distanc« to Closest Competitors)
Main Bank
In (Duration of Relationship)
IntNumber of Competitors)












































Interest Kate Yea Yes Yea" Yes
intercept
Equality Reetriction(i) , F-statiatic





Notes. The dependent variable la the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points. The number of
observations is 15,044. He employ ordinary least squares estimation. *, **, and *** = significant
at lOt, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3. Ln(.
ate the natural log oC on* plus the respective variables. Including: " four loan revisability
^dummies, * eight postal area and 49 industry dummies, and c two year dummies. " Lagrange multiplier
.tost of Effects versus Ho Effects « 390.1***, and Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects
:» 35.fl.̂ .;_*.lxcluding: postal,area and induatry duramies. .>y... ,
